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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * *
KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
Utah Copper Division,
PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiff,

Case No. 15939

v.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and BILL BILANZICH,
Defendants.

* * * * * * *
I.

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE

This is Plaintiff's Reply Brief to the Brief filed by
respondents, Bill Bilanzich and the Industrial Commission of
Utah in the above-entitled Case No. 15939 between Kennecott
Copper Corporation, Utah Copper Division, plaintiff v. the
Industrial Commission of Utah and Bill Bilanzich, defendants, an
original proceeding filed by plaintiff with the Supreme Court of
Utah for the purpose of having the lawfulness of an Order dated
May 5, 1978, and finalized on June 19, 1978, by the Industrial
Commission of Utah inquired into and set aside in its entirety.

II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The essential facts pertinent to this controversy were
not in dispute and were summarized in Plaintiff's Brief heretofore filed in this controversy.

However, there are certain
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facts referred to in Respondent's Brief pertaining to the medical
care of respondent, Bill Bilanzich, which require clarification.
record shows clearly that the alleged incident of Mr. Bilanzich
occurred prior to March 8, 1974 and that he first received treatment
for his wrist condition on September 23, 1974, from Dr. John A.
Gubler, a physician retained by plaintiff to handle and treat both
non-industrial and industrial injuries and illnesses of Kennecott
employees working at its Bingham Mine operations.

Respondent's Brief I

indicates that the company doctor continued to treat the wrist of
Mr. Bilanzich until March of 1977.

However, the record shows clearly

that after the initial visit to Dr. Gubler in September of 1974,

i

I

Bilanzich did not return for any treatment to Dr. Gubler until the
middle of 1976 (R42).
in January of 1975, Mr.

Indeed, the record shows also
Bl~anzich

lR42l

1

that

on his own went for treatment of

his wrist to orthopedic specialist, Dr. Robert H. Lamb, who examined, I
I

cook X-rays and treated the wrist of Mr. Bilanzich.

The record is

clear, of course, and the Administrative Law Judge so found, that no
compensation benefits of any kind by way of temporary total disability benefits, temporary partial disability benefits or permanent '
partial disability benefits were paid at any time by plaintiff to
Bilanzich.

~-I

The Administrative Law Judge in his Findings of Fact (R98

and 99) acknowledged that no such compensation was paid within the
three-year period specified by §35-l-99 U.C.A. but then found as a
rna tter of law that the rendition of medical treatment by the company
retained physician constitutes the payment of compensation under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and thus serves to extend the time within
in which a claim can be filed for workmen's compensation benefits of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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1

all kinds.

No authority was cited by the Administrative Law Judge

for this conclusion of law which was made by the Administrative Law

'I

Judge on his own and which, in the opinion of the plaintiff, flies
squarely in the face of the unanimous Utah Supreme Court decision in
Gardner v. Industrial Commission, 30 Ut.2d 377, 517 P.2d 1329 (Dec.
1973) which clearly excludes the rendering of medical treatment as
"payment of compensation" within the language or the intent of

f

I

section 35-1-99.

Accordingly the plaintiff filed this action with

the Supreme Court and set forth its legal arguments in Plaintiff's
Brief submitted in connection therewith.
Y

I,

Respondent's Brief filed on

I
behalf of the Industrial Commission of Utah and Bill Bilanzich has
attempted to distinguish this case from the Gardner decision and in
addition has raised for the first time the further defense of estop-

I pel as against plaintiff.

I
I

herein as plaintiff's response to those contentions found in the
Respondent's Brief as above set forth.
III.

) I

:.I

)81

Plaintiff's Reply Brief is submitted

1.

STATEMENT OF POINTS

The unanimous Supreme Court decision in the Gardner case

1s not susceptible to the interpretation or explanation accorded to
1t in Respondent's Brief and means exactly what is says, i.e. that
the plain clear language of the statute excludes medical treatment
from consideration as payment of compensation.
2.

Respondent's contention that plaintiff somehow is estopped

from asserting the statute of limitations in this controversy is
~holly

untenable.
IV.

ARGUMENT

n
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THE UNANIMOUS SUPREME COURT DECISION IN
THE GARDNER CASE IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE TO
THE INTERPRETATION OR EXPLANATION ACCORDED TO IT IN RESPONDENT'S BRIEF AND
MEANS EXACTLY WHAT IS SAYS, I.E. THAT THE
PLAIN CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE EXCLUDES MEDICAL TREATMENT FROM CONSIDERATION AS PAYMENT OF COMPENSATION
The Industrial Commission here, as in the Gardner case, has
attempted to bootstrap the rendition of medical treatment into the
payment of compensation under the provisions of section 35-1-99 by
the bold statement that "compensation has been consistently construed to include the payment of medical expenses."

(R98)

No

authority is cited for such a construction and there is none.

On

the contrary this identical issue was the sole matter for resolutic:.
I

by the Supreme Court in the Gardner case where the Industrial Commis·[
sion and the applicant contended, as here,

that the three year

statute mentioned above starts to run from the date of the last
treatment because the rendition of medical treatment constitutes
"payment of compensation within the language of the statute." This
Court, in a unanimous decision, held otherwise, stating that
"under no construction of its wording can one
arrive at such conclusion."
The court in closing referred to the
"plain clear language of the statute, leaving the
matter of changing the language to the legislature if it chooses to liberalize, clarify or
otherwise rewrite it."
The legislature has not thus far made any changes or amendments to
the statute and we submit that it is not within the jurisdiction or
the authority of the Industrial Commission to liberalize or rewritE
the statute by administrative fiat.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The argument in Respondent's Brief that the payment of the
medical services not the rendition of the medical services is the
critical item is equally untenable.

That argument was foreclosed as

early as the Jones case 17 Ut.2d 28 404 P.2d 27 (1965) in which this
court in another unanimous decision held that the payment for medical
services was of no significance in the operation of the limitation
provisions of section 35-l-99 U.C.A.

As stated by the court in its

decision in the Jones case, to hinge the running of the statute of
limitations upon the date of payment for medical services would
"emasculate the obvious legislative intent of the statute."

The

Gardner decision, of course, holds that the same is true with respect
to the date of rendition of the medical services .

.s·l
I

Section 35-l-99 is not the only provision of the Utah Workmen's
Compensation Act which recognizes the separate treatment of compensation vis-a-vis medical expenses.

Other important provisions of the

Act also recognizing this difference are as follows:
(A)

Section 35-1-81.

This section provides for the payment of

medical, hospital and burial expenses, etc.

The key language is in

the beginning of the paragraph as follows:
"In addition to the compensation provided for in
this title, the employer . . . shall in ordinary
cases also be required to ~ such reasonable sum
for mediCal, nurse and hospital services, and for
medicines, and for such artificial means and appliances as may be necessary to treat the patient
Such language, of course, recognizes that medical and hospital exrenses, etc. are clearly separate from and 'in addition to' compensation payments.
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In Kennecott Copper Corporation v. Anderson, 30 U.2d 102, 514 P.2d
217 this Court construed the medical expense language of this section
(35-l-81) and held that the limitation provisions applicable to
compensation payments could not be expanded to include medical expenses.

The following language of the court is significantly appli-

cable to this controversy:
"It is often said that it should be assumed that
all of the words used in a statute were used
advisedly and were intended to be given meaning
and effect. For the same reasons, the omissions
should likewise be taken note of and given effect."
(30 Utah 2d at 105, citing Estate of Barnett 97
Cal. app. 138, 275 P. 453) (emphasis supplied)
In

~he

same case Justice Crockett referred to different juris-

dictions in addition t:

C~a~

i~

which payments for medical care are

not considered the same as "compensation" for lost wages or disabilit:l
rating within the meaning of the statute and therefore, not subject t:,
the limitations prescribed for compensation payments.

( 30 Utah 2d 1021

at 105)
(B)

Section 35-1-45.
"Every employee mentioned in §35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents of every such employee
who is killed, by accident arising out of or in
the course of his employment .
. shall be
entitled to receive, and shall be paid, such
compensation for loss sustained on account of such
injury or death and such amount for medical, nurse
and hospital serVICes and medicines and in the
case of death such amount of funeral expenses as
is herein provided." (emphasis supplied)

Here again is an indication that the employee is to receive
compensation for loss and, in addition, amounts for medical and
hospital expenses, etc.
Sponsored
S.J. Quinney Law
Library. Funding for
digitization
provided by theprovides
Institute of Museumas
and Library
Services
(C) by the
Section
35-1-69.
This
section
follows:
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(1) "If any employee who has previously incurred
a permanent incapacity by accidental injury,
disease, or congenital causes, sustains an industrial injury for which compensation and medical
care is provided by this title that results in
permanent incapacity which is substantially greater
than he would have incurred if he had not had the
pre-existing incapacity, compensation and medical
care, which medical care and other related items
are outlined in §35-1-81, shall be awarded on the
basis of the combined injuries but the liability
of the employer for such compensation and medical
care shall be for the industrial injury only . . . "
And in the following paragraph in the same section, the statute refers
to the special medical panel and its allocation of permanent physical
impairment with the following language:
"The Industrial Commission shall then assess the
liability for compensation and medical care to the
employer on the basis of the percentage of permanent physical impairment attributable to the
industrial injury only .
it

I

It is clear from the above that medical expenses, etc. are
considered separate and distinct from compensation payments in many
areas of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.

.OZI

This Court, we submit,

properly has recognized that distinction in both the Gardner and the
Anderson decisions, pointing out clearly that omissions should be
taken note of and given effect in interpreting statutes and leaving
"the question of any desired clarification to the attention of the
1

legislature".

We submit further that had the legislature, either

originally or following the decision of this Court in the Gardner
case, intended for either the date of rendition of medical services
or the date of payment for the same to be the date for triggering the
running of the statute of limitations in §35-1-99, it could very
easily have done so with specific language to that effect.

To date

Sponsored by thehas
S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding
for digitization provided
the Institute
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both the language and the intent of the limitation of action requirements of that section remain as construed by this court in Gardner
v. Industrial commission and that the claim for compensation benefits
of the applicant Bill Bilanzich in this controversy is barred by
section 35-1-99 because it was not filed within three years from the
date of the accident or from the date of the last payment of compensation as required by the statute.
POINT II
RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT PLAINTIFF
SOMEHOW IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN
THIS CONTROVERSY IS WHOLLY UNTENABLE.
It is contended in Respondent's Brief that plaintiff is estopped
from asserting the

s~a~ute

the defendant for a.Ln1'JS t

2f limitations because its doctor treated

tnree years without advising him of the

extent of his injury or referring him to an orthopedic surgeon until
almost three years after the date of the accident.
is invalid and untenable.

Such contention

In the first place the record shows - and

the defendant has acknowledged - that he did not see the company
doctor (Dr. John A. Gubler) about his wrist condition until September
24, 1974 more than six months after his alleged injury, that he saw
Dr. Gubler again the following week but did not go in again to see
Dr. Gubler about his wrist until the middle of 1976 nearly two years
later (R42).

In the meantime defendant on his own went to an ortho-

pedic specialist Dr. Robert A. Lamb in January 1975 (R36) where xrays were taken and treatment given to defendant in the form of
shots.

Thus it can hardly be contended that the company doctor

treated Mr. Bilanzich from 1974 until 1977 without revealing to him
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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:r

che nature of his wrist problem.

Indeed, it is apparent that Mr.

Bilanzich sought out and consulted with an orthopedic specialist on
his own with respect to this wrist problem and that he did not return
again to the company doctor until almost a year and a half later.
The record shows also that when defendant complained of further
difficulties to Dr. Gubler in November of 1976 he was at that time
referred for additional studies which followed and ultimately resulted
in the wrist surgery in July of 1977.

We submit that two brief

visits by defendant to the company doctor more than six months after
the alleged injury, followed by a waiting period of almost two years,
then a single visit in the middle of 1976 and again in November of
1976 could hardly be construed as giving rise to a legitimate claim
of continuous treatment for three years without disclosure of the
extent of injury and without reference to specialist examination or
assistance as contended in Respondent's Brief in this case.

Indeed,

it is clear that defendant relied not at all on Dr. Gubler, and
it is clear also from defendant's own testimony that he, more than
anyone, was aware of his wrist difficulties but endured his problems
by himself for almost two years before returning to Dr. Gubler for

assistance.

(R42)

Finally, when defendant near the end of November

of 1976 complained of increased wrist difficulty, Dr. Gubler responded with electromyographic studies to be taken at Holy Cross
Hospital and subsequent orthopedic examination and treatment.

Under

such circumstances, we submit that defendant has failed to establish
any of the requisite elements of estoppel in this case and that
Plaintiff Kennecott Copper Corporation clearly is not estopped to
raise Sponsored
the statute
of Law
limitations
issue,
particularly
where
by the S.J. Quinney
Library. Funding for digitization
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by the Institute of Museum
and Librarythere
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never an acknowledgement by the plaintiff by way of workmen's compensation payments or otherwise that it considered defendant's wris
condition to be industrial in nature.

There was no

misrepresentat~

by word or conduct on the part of plaintiff which possibly could ha·.
misled or lulled defendant into a course of inaction by way of

fil~

his claim for benefits; nor was there any reliance by the defendant a
upon any such word or conduct of the plaintiff as required for an

p

estoppel claim of this nature.

t

Indeed it is clear that the defendm

did not rely at all upon any words or conduct of the plaintiff, but
instead he sought and obtained, on his own, examination, treatment
and advice from an orthopedic specialist for the very condition for
which he now seeks compensation.

To hold that by such minimal conti

and treatment over a period of almost three years under such

eire~·

,

stances as indicated above, plaintiff is now estopped from assertinc c
its legal rights under the Utah Workman's Compensation Act would in
effect tend to emasculate the very purposes for which the Act was
designed, i.e. to obtain immediate and necessary medical treatment

together with the payment of compensation for periods of disability n
and at the same time protect against dilatory or unjustified claims.
Certainly an employer should not have to render medical treatment tc
employees at its peril merely because there is some uncertainty as

t

whether the cause for treatment be industrial or non-industrial in
nature.

As Chief Justice Wolfe concurring specially in Crow v. In~

trial Commission et. al. 104 Utah 333 at 338 stated:
"The insurance carrier is not 'estopped' by its
payment of compensation.
It does not pay at the
peril of admitting the extent or duration of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may
contain errors.
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J

disability.
It is not estopped because the applicant has not acted to his detriment in reliance on
its action.
Its action in paying compensation as
if the disability were total for an indefinite
period without requiring applicant to have it
found by the commission as total is all for the
applicant's benefit. To hold otherwise would
discourage a practice highly beneficial to all
parties."

s·

:i
ta·.

.i

In view of the above we submit that in the light of the evidence
and the record in this case, the estoppel position asserted in Res-

tt

pondent's Brief is invalid and wholly untenable as applied to plain~

tiff's conduct or as applied to defendant's reliance upon such conduct

lt

co his detriment.
CONCLUSION
It is the position of the plaintiff that the arguments set forth

Jr
1~

in Respondent's Brief are invalid and untenable; the clear language of

m· the statute (35-1-99), as interpreted in the unanimous decision of this

Lnc court in the Gardner case, excludes medical treatment from considera-

Ln

tion as payment of compensation within the application of the limitacion provisions of this statute.

Plaintiff submits also that the

Industrial Commission's conclusion of law that the rendition of

t

ty medical treatment constitutes "payment of compensation" within the

:ns. language of the statute was erroneous and improper - erroneous because

s

u it flies squarely in the face of the unanimous decision of the Court
t

in the Gardner case and improper because it represents an effort on

n

che part of the Industrial Commission to rewrite or distort the

~

statute by administrative fiat instead of observing the Court's advice
ln

Gardner (20 Utah 2d at 378) by " .

leaving the matter of

changing the language to the legislature if it chooses to liberalize,
~larify

or otherwise rewrite it."
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Accordingly, we respectfully request this Court to reject
Industrial Commission's attempt to rewrite the statute and to affirn
and confirm the Court's prior interpretation of the limitation provisions of §35-1-99 as set forth in the Gardner decision by setting

cop~

aside as contrary to law the Industrial Commission's Order heretofor< pos
entered in this case.

to:

Respectfully submitted this

day of

/flJt7 y

,

of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
79 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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